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DRIVERS OF CHINA’S REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DIPLOMACY: THE 
CASE OF THE SINO-THAI RAILWAY PROJECT 
 
Laurids S. Lauridsen 




Abstract: The land-based Silk Road Economic Belt, as a part of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, has become central for the country’s economic diplomacy since 2013. As part of 
these initiatives, Chinese authorities have been keen to expand their high-speed railways 
across the country’s border into neighbouring countries. Thailand has been one of the front-
runners in negotiating high-speed railway projects with China. This article seeks to answer 
the following questions: what are the driving forces behind the land-based Silk Road Belt; 
what are the rationales behind Sino-Thai rail project; and how can the process and outcome 
of Sino-Thai negotiations be understood? These questions reflect on whether we are 
witnessing Chinese economic diplomacy to advance commercial and wider economic goals 
or Chinese economic statecraft to serve foreign policy objectives. Overall, after examining 
the evidence, the article argues that Silk Road Economic Belt diplomacy, and the Sino-Thai 
rail project all are driven predominantly by economic motivations. 
 




The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – formerly known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) -  
has become a centrepiece of Chinese economic diplomacy since 2013. It encompasses a sea-
based Maritime Silk Road and a land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). As part of the 
latter initiative, Chinese authorities are keen to expand their high-speed railways (HSR) 
across the border to neighbouring countries.1 Chinese political leaders have in recent years 
travelled around Southeast and Central Asia acting as “HSR salesmen” and proponents of 
BRI. According to the Chinese scholar Zhang Yunling (2016, 64) BRI is “an ‘express train’ 
that regional nations cannot afford to miss.” 
 
Thailand has been one of the front-runners in negotiating HSR projects with China (as well as 
Japan). The military junta that seized power in May 2014 decided to proceed with four high-
speed and medium-speed railway lines. The Northeast-South line, which involves Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), was downscaled to medium-speed railway (MSR).2 Thailand 
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and China reached a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in late 2014 concerning 
construction of the 873 kilometre (km) MSR-line from the eastern deep seaport Map Ta Put 
to the northeastern city of Nong Khai (bordering Laos) via Bangkok. They had a signature 
ceremony in late 2015 and construction was to start in May 2016. In March 2016, Thai Prime 
Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha announced that Thailand would take full ownership of 
the project. Later, the first phase – 253 km from Bangkok to Nakhon Ratchasima – was 
agreed upon in September 2016. In June 2017, Prayuth claimed to have cleared the remaining 
legal issues concerning the project using his military junta’s decree powers. Thailand was 
slated to provide the financing and most of the materials, while China was to contribute 
expertise and project supervision. The first Sino-Thai contracts – for design and technical 
advice – were signed in September 2017 and a ground-breaking ceremony for the first small 
section took place in December 2017. 
 
This article analyses the Sino-Thai rail project in the context of the broader BRI . It examines 
the rationale behind Chinese rail diplomacy in Thailand. It seeks to answer the following 
questions: what are the driving forces behind the SREB initiative; what are the rationales 
behind Sino-Thai rail project; and, how can the process and outcome of Sino-Thai 
negotiations be understood? While the first two questions are China-specific, the last 
encompasses positioning and strategic decision-making by Thai authorities. 
 
The next section of the article seeks to conceptualise the driving forces for the project and 
looks at the theoretical and analytical foundation of potential rationales – geo-strategic versus 
economic. This is followed by an examination of the forces behind BRI with an emphasis on 
the land-based SREB followed by a section that focuses on the regional and sectoral 
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dimension of China’s regional rail diplomacy. The article then analyses the Sino-Thai rail 
project and a conclusion follows. 
 
CHINA’S REGIONAL CONNECTIVITY POLICY: GEO-STRATEGY VS. 
ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES 
 
China’s HSR-diplomacy in mainland Southeast Asia is closely linked to BRI that aims to 
facilitate economic connectivity between China and its Southeast Asian neighbours (NDRC 
2015, 3-4). The issue is whether China uses such economic tools to achieve strategic foreign 
policy objectives or whether infrastructure diplomacy is used to advance commercial interests 
and serve broader economic purposes. In this section, conceptual and analytical approaches 
that prioritise strategic objectives are considered in the context of how countries seek to turn 
wealth into global/regional power through strategically manipulated economic statecraft. This 
brings geo-political and geo-economic strategies to the forefront. Next, the section deals with 
concepts and approaches that highlight domestic economic imperatives and how the state 
seeks to boost economic growth and transformation through economic diplomacy. 
 
Geo-strategy and economic statecraft  
 
Geo-strategy is about national strategic political concerns and the dynamics of inter-
governmental relations. One mode of geo-strategy is geo-politics that links geography and 
state territoriality to world-power politics. Here one takes spatial characteristics of resources 
(such as oil) and other geographical conditions into account but still operates within a state-
centric, realist perspective in which all states seek to maximise their relative power (see 
Mackinder 1904; Brzezinski 1997). Hence, we could expect China to challenge the US’s 
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regional position and seek first regional, then global, hegemony (see, for example, 
Mearsheimer 2006).  
 
In relation to regional affairs – and including broader International Relations perspectives – 
the expectation is that China, through military, ideational and institutional efforts, as well as 
more tangible investments and infrastructure development, seeks to construct a regional 
political order that can neutralise containment strategies as well as make it costly for regional 
states not to accommodate China’s strategic interests (Callahan 2016; Zhang 2016). 
 
In the early 1990s, Luttwak (1990) suggested that the reduced role of military power in the 
post-Cold War era would cause the instruments of inter-state rivalry to increasingly be 
economic. In addition to classical trade policy instruments, Luttwak (1990, 23) pointed to 
“the competitive development of commercially important new technologies, the predatory 
financing of their sales during their embryonic stage, and the manipulation of the standards 
that condition their use – the geo-economic equivalents of the offensive campaigns of war.” 
Petsinger (2016, 1) proposes that the increasing use of geo-economic tools is related to the 
rise of China, the revival of state capitalism and SOEs and the deepening of economic 
globalisation. Sparke (2007, 340) suggests that in contrast to the geo-politics of fear that 
reproduce “us” and “them,” geo-economic scholars tend to “anticipate capitalist inclusion 
rather than expulsion or containment of the evil others. Their focus is on networks not blocs, 
connections not walls, and trans-border ties instead of national territories.” While the 
difference between a geo-political and a geo-economic perspective is clear, there is no agreed 
upon definition of the latter. This article will follow Wigell (2016, 137) and define it broadly 
as the geo-strategic use of economic power, but limits that to the use of economic tools to 




Wigell (2016, 144) outlines a typology of geo-economic strategies – one being hegemonic 
geo-economic strategies, which “deploy economic power as a means to uphold regional 
leadership, without habitually resorting to coercion.” This typically encompasses alliance 
building through provision of regional public goods (for example, economic assistance, 
infrastructure, co-operative institutional arrangements) where the regional power bears the 
disproportionate share of the cost of provision (Wigell 2016, 143-45). 
 
The notion of regional geo-strategy relates to the notion of statecraft. In his study of the state-
business interaction in selected Chinese economic sectors, Norris (2016) develops a 
comprehensive analytical framework to understand the conditions under which and the 
manner in which states seek to use economic interaction to promote their strategic goals. He 
understands economic statecraft “as state manipulation of international economic activities 
for strategic purposes” and defines it more precisely as “the state’s intentional manipulation 
of economic interaction to capitalise on, reinforce, or reduce the associated strategic 
externalities” (Norris 2016, 3, 13-14). Norris works from within a neoclassical realist 
perspective and takes his point of departure in the notion of a “grand strategy;” however, he 
relaxes the assumption that the state is a unitary actor and instead uses the degree of state 
unity as an independent variable.  
 
In short, geo-strategy and economic statecraft are one possible way to approach China’s 
infrastructure diplomacy in the context of BRI.  
 




Rather than serving strategic foreign policy objectives, regional infrastructure policy may 
serve economic goals. BRI and rail diplomacy may be driven by commercial goals and 
broader goals of national economic development. Similarly, all states deploy foreign 
economic policy to ensure a favourable external environment for advancing their domestic 
economy. In China, as elsewhere, we should expect commercial actors to engage in various 
forms of cross-border interaction and to seek state support in their process of 
internationalisation. This brings issues such as market opportunities, access to finance, access 
to cutting-edge technology, standard setting and access to supplies for energy resources to the 
forefront (see Breslin 2013, Brautigam and Tang 2012, Summers 2016). 
 
From this perspective BRI and overseas rail infrastructure projects are not about economic 
statecraft but about economic diplomacy. This can be defined as the decision-making behind, 
policy-making of, and advocating of broader nationally-defined economic strategies. Lee and 
Hacking (2010, 9-10) argue that “diplomats can be seen as the agents of globalisation given 
their direct involvement in the creation, development, and regulation of markets and capital 
through trade and finance negotiations, as well as commercial activity.” Naray (2008, 2) uses 
the term “commercial diplomacy” to denote a slightly narrower range of activities “conducted 
by state representatives with diplomatic status in view of business promotion at home and a 
host country. It aims at encouraging business development through a series of business 
promotion and facilitation activities.” 
 
In the Chinese context, such networking has been highlighted by Gonzales-Vicente (2011, 
403), who argues that SOEs cannot be analysed through a state versus market binary; instead, 
it is a combined process, in which the internationalisation of the Chinese state is an 
“increasingly decentred process impelled by an entrepreneurial statehood rationale.” 
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Accordingly, this process is driven by the central government, by marketised state branches 
in the form of SOEs and by local contingencies in overseas operations. Breslin (2013, 1274) 
similarly makes a call for disaggregating China into different interests and actors and for not 
underestimating the role of commercial goals. We should expect to find a disaggregation of 
China into a variety of actors with different interests, so that “within any given sector there is 
typically more than one state (or state-related) actor, and competition between different SOEs 
is far from uncommon (even when supposed divisions of interest and activity have been 
established between them)” (Breslin 2013, 1282).  
 
This call for a decentred actor approach does not stand in contrast to searching for more 
structural economic drivers behind SREB and overseas infrastructure projects. As in 
capitalism in general, there are also fundamental contradictions in Chinese capitalism that 
lead to over-accumulation/under-consumption crises and generate shifting strategies – 
technical, organisational, and spatial fixes – to solve them. Moreover, China’s position in 
global value chains is not stable. Thus, global value chain scholars argue that there is an on-
going transformation of China from being a production hub in global buyer-driven chains to 
becoming an emergent end-market fuelling regional value chains (Gereffi 2014). This 
change, and the related technological upgrades, leads to changing trade and investment 
patterns, which in turn may drive global and regional infrastructure projects and related 
economic diplomacy. 
 
Scholars who argue that the Chinese use the economic toolkit for commercial and broader 
economic reasons would consider China’s rail diplomacy as “normal” state-sponsored 
economic interaction. They would also normally agree that China is characterised by 
“fragmented authoritarianism,” meaning, for example, that one should not expect the 
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activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be tightly co-ordinated with the Ministry of 
Commerce.3 
 
However, some scholars are more open to the role state guidance in China’s expansion 
abroad. Thus, Brautigam and Tang (2012, 802-03) call state-involvement in promoting firm-
level activities with mostly commercial rationales for “the developmental state abroad.” They 
argue that apart from the stronger role of Chinese SOEs, this is not different from what Japan 
and Taiwan did earlier. 
 
In contrast, Jones and Zou (2017) argue that the fragmentation, decentralisation and 
internationalisation of the state apparatus have undermined the direct control of the state over 
SOEs. As Jones and Zou (2017, 744) explain it, the result is that we have “an evolving, 
struggle between disparate actors within a fragmented, poorly coordinated governance 
structure in which the state can only direct SOEs “by issuing targets, principles and 
guidelines,” giving SOEs considerable interpretive latitude if they present their commercial 
strategies as enacting overall directives (Jones and Zou 2017, 749). 
 
In short, BRI and rail diplomacy may be driven by firm-level commercial goals and broader 
goals of national economic development. The former includes supporting the competitiveness 
and internationalisation of, for example, construction and equipment firms. The latter refers 
to more structural issues such as dealing with domestic over-capacity, domestic economic 
upgrading and infrastructural aspects of regional supply chains. In the following section, I 
will discuss whether this is the case or if we find a coherent foreign policy directed strategy – 
geo-political or geo-economic – where China uses economic statecraft to enhance its efforts 
to establish a hegemonic regional order. If the latter, we would expect China to bear the 
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disproportional share of the cost of rail infrastructure provision and compromise on 
commercial profitability. 
 
Drivers of the Silk Road Belt 
 
China’s involvement in Thailand’s railway expansion is part of President Xi Jinping’s BRI . 
Xi became general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012 and 
launched the land-based part of BRI in September 2013. In March 2015, the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), together with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Ministry of Commerce, and with State Council authorisation, produced a BRI 
“white paper” (NDRC, 2015). It emphasises win-win regional and bilateral co-operation, 
openness to all countries, common interests, dialogue between “civilisations” and 
connectivity of “infrastructure construction plans and technical standard systems.” The latter 
encompasses transport, energy, and communication infrastructure (NDRC, 2015). Funding 
will come from new institutions such as the Silk Road Fund (US$40 billion) and the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank ($100 billion) but will mostly from state-owned “policy 
banks” such as China Exim-Bank, China Development Bank and China Investment 
Corporation. During the 19th National CCP Congress in 2017, BRI was – as part of “Xi 
Jinping Thought” – written into the CCP constitution, indicating that it will have high policy 
priority at least through 2022 (Reuters October 24, 2017). 
 
In order to ensure coherence in the foreign economic policy-making of the Chinese party-
state, Xi Jinping centralised decision-making on BRI. A special Leading Small Group with a 
secretariat in the NDRC was established to oversee and co-ordinate the implementation of 
BRI. Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang made the major BRI announcements and Vice-
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Premier Zhang Gaoli led the Leading Small Group (2015-2017). Clearly, BRI is a national 
strategic priority and policy coherence is a main concern (Yang and Parker 2015; Callahan 
2016, 229-30; Hong 2016, 3). 
 
Various observers and scholars believe BRI is primarily driven by strategic concerns. In the 
following section, I will outline these strategic concerns and economic statecraft. However, 
the argument in this article is for more attention to commercial goals and broader economic 
imperatives Although Beijing explicitly states that BRI is not  a geo-political tool or amounts 
to a diplomatic offensive (Hong 2016, 4-5), it is useful to understand  it through geo-political 
and geo-economic perspectives.  
 
Overall, BRI/SREB can be instrumental to Xi’s “Chinese Dream” of a great national 
rejuvenation that will allow China to return to great-power status without provoking the USA 
or producing a counter-reaction from its neighbours (Clarke 2017,72). There are several 
reasons for this. First, BRI can be seen as China’s response to US President Obama’s “pivot 
to Asia” (Wang 2016,457-58). This included the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which aimed to 
tighten the economic linkages between selected Asian allies and the USA and tame China by 
writing the future economic rules in the region (Wilson 2015, 248-250). Obama tried to 
counter the Chinese competitiveness by introducing advanced, so-called golden standards 
that fit highly developed countries and by setting up rules that restricted subsidies to Chinese 
SOEs (Obama 2015). 
 
Second, the Chinese government reacted to the Obama’s pivot through its own pivot toward 
the West, within China and beyond (Swaine 2015, 14). BRI intends to develop a “Eurasian” 
transport corridor that will lessen the country’s dependence on current sea routes, partly to 
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make China less dependent on the narrow Strait of Malacca but more generally to give China 
the possibility of bypassing sea-lanes that are subject to American naval dominance and 
prone to conflicting claims such as the South China Sea (Rolland 2015). 
 
Third, BRI is a different template of regional order (Ferdinand 2016, 946-48). The 
administrations in the USA and Japan proposed a Trans-Pacific template with an emphasis on 
free markets, private entrepreneurship, services, investments, financial liberalisation and 
uniform rulemaking. The Chinese regime advanced an Asian-centred template, with an 
emphasis on state-driven activities, physical infrastructure links, policy-led trade facilitation 
and case-by-case negotiation on the allocation of resources and the direction of development 
(Arase 2015, 33-34). 
 
Fourth, Beijing officials also hoped that BRI could safeguard regional stability and expand 
regional influence. One element was the use of cross-border extensions of trade and 
infrastructure in the West and the South as a way of preventing ethnic conflicts in 
neighbouring countries from spilling over into China, which already had conflicts in Tibet 
and Xinjiang (Rolland 2015, 3). By lifting living standards in both its outer provinces and 
neighbouring countries, Beijing aspired to moderate “the three evils” of separatism, 
extremism and terrorism. Another element was to deepen inter-dependence, shape 
preferences, instil confidence and build trust with neighbouring countries. In part, China did 
this by presenting itself as a benevolent partner that would not interfere in domestic affairs 
(Arase 2015, 31-35). 
 
In brief, it appears that there is certain support for the interpretation that China uses its 
overseas infrastructure projects to serve strategic foreign policy objectives. As a result, if 
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implemented, BRI could have significant geo-political implications. At the same time, 
continued economic development remains particularly important for a party-state that 
maintains its legitimacy and social and political stability by delivering economic growth and 
creating employment opportunities. Such economic drivers also influence BRI. 
 
A major challenge for the CCP is regional inequality, which has seen Western and 
Southwestern provinces fall behind. The BRI white paper places Yunnan and the Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous region as gateways to the ASEAN countries (NDRC 2015, 9). BRI can 
be interpreted as a way of using infrastructure projects to reinvigorate the economy in these 
frontier regions and to give them direct access to international markets (Clarke 2017, 73-74; 
Cai 2017 6-8).4 While regional balancing is important, there are also several national 
economic incentives associated with BRI. 
 
One of these incentives involves access to natural resources, particularly energy resources. 
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and has become increasingly reliant on imports (Liu 
and Dunford 2016, 9-12). In addition, the economy increasingly relies on imports for 
industrial raw materials as well as grains and other food products. This natural resource 
vulnerability links to BRI, as it is seen to open alternative routes of transport from resource-
rich Central Asian countries and for land-based alternatives to sea lanes for oil and raw 
materials from Africa and the Middle East Two further domestic challenges facing the 
Chinese economy are surplus capital and industrial over-capacity (The Economist, February 
27, 2016, 51-52). Since the mid-1990s, China has followed an export-led growth model, 
converting China into the “workshop of the world.” This model was characterised by low 
wages, resulting in a low domestic consumption rate. High savings rates and subsequent trade 
surpluses have given China international financial power in the form of huge foreign-
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exchange reserves. Some argue that OBOR and related infrastructure banks are a way of 
tackling the problem of excessive foreign exchange reserves, which are currently sent back to 
the USA and invested in Treasury bonds. By channelling funds to other locations in Asia, 
China can also alleviate the risk of being “addicted to” these bonds. Another, though minor, 
economic motive may be the internationalisation of China’s currency. Whereas cross-border 
flows can be settled in RMB, flows of investment using excess reserves will typically be in 
US dollars, as will the funding through the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (Arase 2015, 
31; Summers 2016, 1637). In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, a huge financial 
stimulus package resulted in an investment boom that led to further contradictions in the 
economic model – now in the form of excess capacity, falling profits, over-stretched banks 
and bad debts. The result was that China developed a classical over-accumulation crisis and 
subsequent push for capital exports (Hung 2015). 
 
Therefore, BRI is a way of exporting over-capacity in the construction and steel industries 
and enhancing the investment returns to more profitable investments sites through relocation. 
Moreover, China’s 2015 concept of “International Capacity Co-operation” is meant to also 
relocate manufacturing capacity in more capital-intensive industries to other countries (see 
Lu 2016; Cai 2017; The State Council 2015). However, due to the limited scale, BRI projects 
cannot solve all of China’s over-capacity problems. As Hofman (2015) explains: “While it is 
true that the New Silk Road needs a lot of investment, even the highest estimates would 
constitute a relatively modest share of China’s $5 trillion annual investments back home. 
Investment of $1 trillion over 10-15 years is not going to absorb a lot of China’s 
overcapacity.” Hong (2016, 20-21) reaches a similar conclusion regarding BRI to solving and 
over-capacity in the steel industry. Hence, the BRI initiatives amount to an element in a 




A further economic driver is industrial upgrading and the export of high-end manufactured 
goods as a means to (slowly) alleviate the under-consumption problem.5 The Chinese 
leadership fears that rising wages will result in China losing its comparative advantages in 
cheap labour manufacturing. Therefore, it is prioritising upgrades to the production structure 
and has announced a transition to a more innovative economy. Overseas infrastructure 
projects and related economic zones offer an opportunity to relocate low-value added 
manufacturing facilities to neighbouring countries. China can then export higher value-added 
goods and services to these countries in exchange for agricultural goods, raw materials and 
resource-intensive intermediate goods (Lin 2015, 589; Mingjiang 2015; Holslag 2015). There 
is also an important expectation that BRI partners will be more willing to enter into such 
regional value chains and accept Chinese standards (Cai 2017, 9). 
 
Upgrading of China’s manufacturing capabilities has been on the state agenda since 2011 in 
the form of seven “Strategic Emerging Industries.” It has also been highlighted in the “Made 
in China 2025” plan. Furthermore, the Chinese leadership in 2015 accelerated a wave of 
mergers among SOEs. This was partly to reduce over-capacity and avoid vicious competition, 
but meta-mergers were also introduced to boost competitiveness. Within the logistics and 
infrastructure sector, this led to the formation of one major rail rolling stock SOE (see 
below). Thus, BRI can in part also be understood as economic diplomacy measures nurturing 
national champions or “dragon heads” as globally competitive multinational companies 
(Leutert 2016, 2-3).  
 
Related,  BRI  represents a new phase of China’s opening-up. China started bringing in 
Western investment in the 1990s, followed by “a Going Global” policy during the first 
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decade of the 2000s. This is now accelerated through a cross-border extension of the “Go 
West” policy, which was initiated in 2001. Through BRI, selected cities in Western and 
Southern China are to serve as developmental gateways to neighbouring regions. Thus, China 
is now the leading trade partner with the ASEAN region and, although it is still smaller than 
Japan as an investor, Chinese investment has increased, reaching 37% on average of the 
inflow of FDI from Japan in 2013-15 (ACIF 2016, 14, 38). Hence, BRI is a piece of 
economic diplomacy in which Chinese leaders try to support and lead this internationalisation 
process to advantage the country’s economic transformation and as a way of advancing Sino-
centred regional productions chains. This impetus may take form of state leadership and 
control but may also be more indirect, exerting leadership, as suggested by Jones and Zou 
(2017), through setting broad targets and guidelines for profit-seeking SOEs.  
 
In short, while BRI may be driven by geo-political and geo-economic strategic concerns, it is 
better understood as being motivated by a range of economic imperatives (industrial over-
capacity, surplus capital, access to resources, market access, export of standards and global 
competitiveness) in the on-going process of the Chinese economy’s globalisation and 
regionalisation. Using the case of apparel productions networks, Zhu and Pickles (2014) have 
demonstrated that industrial upgrading, relocation to inland China and relocation overseas are 
closely related. They argue that “state policies, social pressures on low-wage manufacturing 
and changing demands of different end markets are becoming important drivers of industrial 
upgrading in eastern China and crucial drivers of the relocation of low value-added segments 
of the industry to other regions and countries” (Zhu and Pickles 2014, 37). Similarly, this 
article suggests that BRI is mainly driven by China’s search for a new engine of economic 





CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE DIPLOMACY: REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND 
SECTORAL DYNAMICS 
 
As part of BRI, the Chinese government has launched a multi-year infrastructure investment 
programme that aims at linking China with the rest of the world. At the same time, it also 
aims to improve infrastructure connectivity with Southeast Asia and through that develop 
broader economic co-operation with its southern neighbours. However, it will also allow 
China to compete with Japan, which has been engaged in infrastructure development in the 
Southeast Asian region for decades. Due to run-down and under-utilised rail networks in the 
region, it was considered a promising investment market. An ADB report (2009, 167, 169) 
estimated that between 2010 and 2020 a total of $2.5 trillion of investments was needed in 
transport in Asia, of which $38.6 billion was in railways. In addition, a further $82.8 billion 
was identified for regional projects along the Trans-Asian Railway, of which the Pan-Asia 
Network is a part. 
 
ASEAN and the Pan-Asia Rail Network 
 
Xi Jinping’s government has made the railway sector a top priority in the expanding co-
operation between China and ASEAN and has promised special infrastructure loans for 
ASEAN-China infrastructure development. The increased interest is reflected in China’s 
involvement in discussions of the Master Plans on ASEAN Connectivity 2010/2025 through 
the Chinese Working Committee of China-ASEAN Connectivity Co-operation (ASEAN 




China has also strengthened its involvement in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). In 
contrast to Japan, China has direct access to mainland Southeast Asia and considers its GMS 
involvement as a natural complement to its sub-national regional strategy for connecting 
Chinese provinces with neighbouring countries. To boost infrastructure development, China 
has promised funding focused along the North-South Economic Corridor that makes Yunnan 
a “gateway to the South” and involves close allies, Laos and Cambodia. This is 
complementary to Japan’s interests in the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern 
Economic Corridor. The vice chairman of the NDRC, Wang Xiaotao, has underlined that the 
Chinese government will give priority to building road and rail connections with Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand (The Nation, November 25, 2017; Li 2016; Summers 
2016). 
 
China’s involvement in upgrading railways links with Thailand and Laos is part of a larger 
Pan-Asia Railway Network from Kunming in China’s Yunnan province to Singapore. Plans 
to link Singapore and Yunnan were proposed in colonial times, but the modern form – the 
Singapore-Kunming Rail Link – was proposed by ASEAN more than 20 years ago. It 
encompassed an eastern and a western line that would build upon existing national networks, 
crossing seven ASEAN countries.  
 
However, in 2007 China and Thailand agreed to a proposed central route via Laos, which 
would allow a railway network with three 4,500-5,500 km lines. The present China-Laos-
Thailand projects aim at implementing this Pan-Asia Railway Network by having a central 
line linking Kunming and Singapore with Bangkok as the main hub. This could link to the 
2,264 km HSR line from Shanghai to Kunming that was in full operation by December 2016 
(China Daily, December 28, 2016). The central route is consistent with China’s involvement 
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in North-South Economic Corridor, which also runs from Kunming to Bangkok. The 
administration in Beijing has emphasised reaching an agreement with Thailand on the railway 
between Bangkok and the Lao border and using it as a showcase for their involvement in 
regional infrastructure projects.  
 
High-Speed Rail: Sectoral Dynamics 
 
The drivers behind the building of Chinese high-speed rail networks abroad are of particular 
interest here, because HSR has become the cornerstone of China’s infrastructure diplomacy 
under BRI, and the two are inter-related. According to Kratz and Pavlicević (2016, 8): 
 
the two are mutually reinforcing: the attractiveness of HSR spearheads China’s 
OBOR campaign abroad and in return the going out of HSR benefits from the support 
of the political and financial commitment and vigorous public diplomacy promoting 
the OBOR initiative around the world. 
 
In 2004, the Chinese Ministry of Railways decided to push a domestic state-guided HSR 
development based on imported technologies; subsequently, domestic HSR expansion 
became a part of the huge 2008 stimulus package following the Global Financial Crisis. The 
domestic experience served as a stepping-stone for the export of HSR systems. Exports took-
off in 2011 when Beijing launched a campaign to export HSR-rail systems around the world. 
A second wave began in late 2014 with strong backing from Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang with 





China’s HSR technology had been developed through a combination of pre-existing 
technological capabilities and re-engineering, followed by the experience obtained from 
constructing and providing equipment for 20,000km of HSR tracks domestically.6 This 
allowed China to offer an internationally competitive technology at low cost and with fast 
delivery. The main companies involved in overseas HSR projects are the China Railway 
Group (CREC) and China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) involved in 
construction and China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC), a rolling stock 
company.  
 
CRRC is a state nurtured national champion. Previously, there were two major SOEs within 
the rail equipment sector: China CSR Corporation and China CNR Corporation. Initially the 
two firms competed aggressively in foreign bidding processes abroad (EIU 2016, 37). In June 
2015, these two SOEs were merged into CRRC in order to boost international 
competitiveness and eliminate price wars. CRRC is slated to deliver trains to the Sino-Thai 
Rail project (South China Morning Post, September 26, 2016).  
 
The two major marketised SOEs – CREC and CRCC  went public in 2008, with CRCC 
having a greater share of private ownership. CREC had in 2017 projects in 17 countries 
(CREC 2017). In addition to the Thai project, in Southeast Asia, CREC is also involved in 
Indonesia and Malaysia and was keen to bid on the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur HSR line until 
the change of regime in Malaysia  Bangkok Post, March 22, 2016; South China Morning 
Post, July 11, 2016). CRCC is China’s second largest construction company. It has 
established a subsidiary, China Railway Construction (Southeast Asia) Company, located in 





Another rationale behind the drive to export in HSR is over-capacity. China’s domestic HSR 
industry will only have sufficient domestic demand if the government builds its planned 
15,000km by 2025. However, this expansion is tied to the realisation of mega-city plans and 
to how much debt the already heavily indebted state-owned operator of trains, China Railway 
Corporation (CRC), can take on board (The Economist, January 14, 2017, 48). This 
uncertainty makes foreign projects attractive. As Peel and Hornby (2016) observe, “big rail 
projects are useful to China because they mop up spare supply-chain capacity that lacks 
enough orders domestically.” This is particularly the case in related industries like iron, steel 
and aluminium that are all burdened by debt and low capacity utilisation. Even the rolling 
stock industry may need to offload over-capacity. CRRC, which derives 88% of its sales from 
domestic customers, plans to expand the export share to 20% (EIU 2016 October, 37). The 
use of exports to offset the slowdown in domestic orders became urgent in 2017, as China’s 
spending on new HSR and mass-transit systems decreased (Caixin, September 22, 2017).  
 
In China – as elsewhere – the export of huge infrastructural projects requires commercial and 
wider economic diplomacy involving government-to-government negotiations. In contrast to 
Japan, where HSR diplomacy tends to be organised around Public-Private Partnership models 
involving the host government (through loans) and Japanese companies, China has 
demonstrated financial flexibility with a preference for a “loan and build” approach known as 
the “EPC-F” model involving engineering, procurement and construction plus financing 
(Pavlićević and Kratz 2017, 21. The financial component often takes the form of loan 
commitments made by one of the two policy banks, China Development Bank or the China 
Exim-Bank, so that China can offer not only low overall costs but also soft loans with low 




The HSR industry is one of the strategic emerging industries where China can influence the 
establishment of international standards. Therefore, the HSR industry will, as part of “Made 
in China 2025,” has access to new “government guidance funds” that allocate public 
investments. Hence, CCRC announced it will participate in the Central Enterprise National 
Entrepreneurship Guidance Fund, which is dedicated to developing investment projects 
abroad and which the company will use to set up 11 regional branches around the world 
(Kozul-Wright and Poon 2017; Caixin, July 4, 2017).  
 
Summing up, Chinese leaders have acted as “HSR salesmen” all over the world. Besides 
being part of a process of normal commercial diplomacy supporting local exporters in the 
international markets, HSR also appears to be part of a broader set of economic dynamics 
linked to advancing structural change and technological upgrading and through that 
advancement of the country’s economic power. It is connected to a state guided process of 
mergers, technological upgrading and reforms that will offload some over-capacity in the 
HSR and related supplier industries.  
 
Likewise, HSR diplomacy – mostly through related financing – interacts with a broader 
regional infrastructural diplomacy. China has set aside funds via the Silk Road Fund and 
made loan commitments to infrastructural projects in the Mekong and the broader ASEAN 
region. By doing so, the HSR offensive may go beyond economic goals and also serve 
strategic foreign policy goals. Through presenting itself as a responsible regional power 
providing much-needed public goods (railways) and creating a climate of friendship, HSR 
diplomacy can – as suggested by Wigell (2016) – widen the scope for broader regional co-
operation and alliance building. The extent to which this happens and becomes economic 
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statecraft depends on whether it is possible to mitigate the fragmented authority and ensure 
policy coherence across the involved state agencies, SOEs and policy banks (Norris 2016). 
Here the rail SOEs involved have all gone public and therefore have incentives to follow their 
commercial agenda and take notice of the relevant stock markets. Further, although it still is a 
policy bank, the Exim-Bank is supposed to work on a break-even basis and has become more 
commercially-oriented (Corkin 2011, 73-74).  
 
In the following section, the interconnectedness of BRI and HSR-diplomacy will be 
examined with attention to the case of the Sino-Thai railway project. 
 
THE SINO-THAI RAILWAY PROJECT 
 
The Sino-Thai railway project is part of the proposed Pan-Asian Railway Network linking 
Kunming with Singapore along a line through Vientiane and Bangkok. This line is now part 
of BRI and China’s HSR diplomacy, even if the railway is now quasi-high-speed.  
 
Rail infrastructure upgrading plans  
 
A goal of the Thai state for several decades has been to improve trans-border connectivity as 
well as obtain within-border upgrading of the country’s railways. This goal has received 
considerably more attention since the turn of the century. As in other countries in the region, 
transport in Thailand mostly takes place by road and this is costlier and more fuel-intensive 
than rail transport. In the 2010s, Thailand had just over 4,000 km railway tracks, almost all of 
them single track and very old. The average speed of freight trains was 39 kilometres per 
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hour (kph) with passenger trains averaging 60 kph (Pichet 2015). This put the upgrading the 
railways high on the policy agenda.  
 
The Infrastructure Development Master Plan 2015-2022 targeted increasing the operating 
speed to 60 kph for freight and 100 kph for passenger trains. It was planned to expand the 
amount of passenger trips from 45 to 75 million per year and freight transportation by rail 
from 2.5% to 5%. The Plan gives high priority to developing a double-tracked rail network 
that will start with diesel locomotives but later become electrified (NESDB 2016; Interview, 
Ministry of Transport Official, Bangkok, February 2016). Another priority project is standard 
rail development, which in contrast to the present metre gauge has a so-called standard gauge 
of 1.435 metres and allows for HSR transport. It is here the Sino-Thai Railway project comes 
to the fore and where a competing Thai-Japanese HSR project connecting Bangkok and 
Chiang Mai also fits in. As mentioned previously, the 873km Sino-Thai line is linked to 
Nong Khai and the border with Laos in the North, from the Map Ta Phut harbour in the South 
on the Gulf of Thailand. 
 
Sino-Thai negotiations on a possible HSR-line date back to the Abhisit Vejjajiva government 
(2008-2011), when the first negotiations on a possible joint venture took place. During the 
Yingluck Shinawatra government (2011-2014), a set of mega-projects with a total value of 2 
trillion baht ($62 billion) were listed in the Infrastructure Development Plan 2014-2020 and 
much emphasis was put on getting the private sector to invest through public-private 
partnership arrangements. Of the total planned investments, 83% were reserved for rail, of 
which the HSR accounted for 783 billion baht with double-tracking costing 403 billion 




The Yingluck government decided to borrow two trillion baht, mainly on the domestic 
financial market and through a government bond issue. In April 2012, the governments of 
China and Thailand signed an MoU on Sino-Thai railway co-operation. By then, China had 
conducted field geological surveys on two HSR projects along the Bangkok-Chiang Mai and 
the Bangkok-Nong Khai routes. In November 2013, co-operation on the latter route became 
linked to an agricultural product barter deal covering up to 50% of the construction costs. By 
then, Premier Li had already visited Thailand and addressed Thailand’s parliament, where he 
pitched the HSR plan as part of a broad roadmap for Sino-Thai co-operation. Other themes 
included energy, water conservancy, education, and financial collaboration (China Daily 
October 12, 2013). He also promised to import one million tons of rice and to consider 
importing more natural rubber. The visit came a month after President Xi had launched BRI 
in Kazakhstan. 
 
Subsequently, Yingluck went on a roadshow to promote her government’s infrastructure 
mega-projects, including the Sino-Thai rail project. However, the domestic bond issue met 
strong resistance from the opposition Democrat Party and became part of a cocktail of anti-
government street politics and judicial actions to bring down her government. Even though 
the off-budget loan bill passed the Senate in November 2013, the Constitutional Court in 
April 2014 found it unconstitutional, thereby aborting the whole infrastructure plan (Bangkok 
Post, March 29, 2013; The New York Times, March 12, 2014). 
 
However, the military regime that came to power following the May 2014 coup repackaged 
the mega-projects and restarted the negotiations with China. The regime came up with a 2.4 
trillion baht Masterplan for Infrastructure 2014-2022, which set aside 393 billion baht for the 
Nong Khai-Bangkok-Map Ta Phut HSR line (BoI 2014, 5-6; Interview, NESDB Official, 
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Bangkok, February 2016). Soon after, to stimulate the slowing economy and restore declining 
foreign investment, the total infrastructure investment was expanded to 3.38 trillion in the 
Infrastructure Development Master Plan 2015-2022, with 495 billion set aside for double-
track rail development (NESDB 2016; BoI 2014). 
 
A reduced and delayed rail project 
 
In late July 2014, the military junta decided to go forward with the two HSR projects, 
including the Bangkok-Nong Khai route. During a Bangkok GMS Summit in December – in 
which Chinese Premier Li participated – an MoU on the railway project and a purchase 
agreement on rice and rubber were signed. The former was a government-to-government 
agreement that on the Chinese side would share railway construction between CREC and 
CRCC. By then the project had been scaled down from HSR to a MSR. The standard double-
track rail lines would be constructed for a maximum speed of 250 kph and thus allow for a 
later shift to a high-speed train. In June 2015, Thailand’s deputy Prime Minister Pridiyathorn 
Devakula claimed it was a Chinese decision to downscale to MSR to better support cargo 
transport (South China Morning Post, June 26, 2015). 
 
The project was a top priority for Prime Minister Gen Prayuth and another Deputy Prime 
Minister Somkid Jatusripitak, who was in charge of the junta’s economic policy. At a lower 
level, the Ministry of Transport, Finance Ministry, National Economic and Social Board 
(NESDB) and the State Railway of Thailand (SRT), were involved in an inter-ministerial 
group and participated in negotiations. On the Chinese side, the NDRC co-ordinated 
negotiations, which have also involved the CRC and the two construction SOEs – CREC and 
CRCC. NDRC Vice Chairman Wang Xiaotao served as the chief negotiator (NDRC 2017). 
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His Thai counterpart was Minister of Transport Arkhom Termpittayapaisith, appointed in 
August 2015.  
 
Co-operation under the “EPC- F” model meant the project would adopt Chinese technical 
railway standards with a standard gauge of 1.435 metres and incorporate a mixture of 
passenger and freight rolling stock. The Thai side would be responsible for land acquisition, 
environment impact assessment, civil work , mechanical and electrical work for building 
services, concrete sleepers for tracks and ancillary works. China would conduct the feasibility 
study and the detailed design for the project, including the mechanical and electrical work for 
signalling and telecommunication systems, power supply, trains control and track work. 
China was also responsible for tunnelling and long span bridges as well for establishing a 
technology transfer and staff training centre, which would train at least 800 Thai staff (Prasert 
2015, 67-68). In short, China was generally in charge of high-tech, complex tasks, while the 
Thai side was in charge simpler, low/medium-tech tasks. Whereas it was decided to use 
Chinese track systems, the original MoU did not specify the rolling stock but it was implicit 
that it would be from China (Interview, former Ministry of Transport Official, Bangkok, 
February 2016). 
 
The MoU also led to the formation of a Joint Committee on Railway Co-operation (hereafter 
the Joint Committee). During 2015, the Joint Committee held nine meetings, but there was 
almost no progress. Negotiations were difficult and stalled on several issues – construction 
costs, financing costs and interest rates, burden sharing, rice/rubber-for-rail deals, technology 




During the January-March 2016, the negotiations on financing and risk sharing continued, 
with Thailand’s negotiators starting to backtrack. Among other things, they suggested 
reducing the project outlay by having only a single railway track on the Nakhon Ratchasima-
Nong Khai section, and they wanted the Chinese to take a majority stake in the project (The 
Nation, February 15, 2016; Can 2016; Interview, Ministry of Transport Official, Bangkok, 
February 2016). Abruptly, in March 2016, Prime Minister Prayuth stated at a meeting in 
China that Thailand would stop the joint venture talks and in build the 253 km Bangkok-
Nakhon Ratchasima section with full Thai financing. He startled observers by declaring that 
the remaining part of the railway would be suspended, at least for the time being. Despite 
this, the project continued to involve the Chinese, since the plan was still to contract Chinese 
construction firms to build the line, buy Chinese-made trains, and use Chinese system 
technology (The Nation, March 31, 2016).  
 
To put additional pressure on Beijing, the Thai government accelerated its negotiations with 
Japan on the Bangkok-Chiang Mai line (see below) and decided to speed up two other 
planned standard gauge HSR lines: Bangkok-Hua Hin and Bangkok-Rayong. Further, the 
Thai government divided the Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima MSR line into four sections with 
different starting dates – starting with a first project of just 3.5 km, followed by a second of 
11km, and then two projects of 119 km each (The Nation, July 30, 2016; Parameswaran 
2016). Concurrently, Sino-Thai negotiations continued and at the 14th meeting of the Joint 
Committee in September 2016 an agreement was reached on the first phase of the Bangkok-
Nakhon Ratchasima track with a total cost of 179 billion baht. Thailand would bear the total 
construction cost with China possibly providing funds for technical systems and rolling stock 
(The Nation, August 24, 2016; The Nation, September 21, 2016). However, the finance 
conditions were not agreed upon. The construction of the 3.5 km section did not start as 
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planned in 2016, although the 179 billion baht was included in the budget for FY2017 
(Bangkok Post, October 22, 2016; The Nation, November 1, 2016). 
 
During the first half of 2017, three more committee meetings were held. Chinese discontent 
with Thailand’s positions and the constant delays led to the non-invitation of Gen Prayuth to 
the huge Silk Road Summit in May 2017. Prayuth reacted by using his junta-granted 
executive power to over-rule technical and legal problems related to public procurement, site 
clearance, land use, the work of Chinese engineers and the use of Chinese construction 
materials in Thailand. After approval by both the Cabinet and the National Legislative 
Assembly in July, the Joint Committee concluded two minor contracts worth 5.2 billion baht 
at its 20th meeting in mid-August 2017 (RTG 2017). The contracts covered detailed design 
work and supervision by Chinese engineers (Hunt 2017; Xinhua August 19, 2017; The Strait 
Times, November 16, 2017). Subsequently, Gen Prayuth participated in the BRICS summit in 
September 2017, where Thailand was invited as observer country and where the contracts 
were signed (Pongphisoot 2017a). The construction work of the first 3.5 km, which was a 
Thai responsibility, was planned to start “soon” but was soon postponed as an environmental 
impact assessment report was delayed; repeated delays are quite normal in Thai infrastructure 
projects. The Department of Highways was allocated the construction work and a ceremony 
for the commencement of the piling work took place on December 21, 2017 (Reuters, 
December 21, 2017). 
 
The invitation to public bidding for the subsequent sections did not take place as planned 
during the first half of 2018. At the June 2018 24th Joint Committee meeting, the first 253-km 
phase was divided into 14 separate contracts. During the following meeting one of these 
contracts (“contract 2.3”) worth 38.5 billion baht and covering tracks, electronics, machinery 
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and procurement of train carriages was discussed. The planned bidding rounds, planned for 
later in 2018, did not take place and by mid-February 2019 “contract 2.3” was still under 
negotiation. The intention was to have all remaining contracts ready by May 2019, so that 
construction could start in June, although this seems unlikely for while the 3.5 km segment is 
still under construction, further delays of the first phase of the project may be expected 
(Xinhua, June 2, 2018; Bangkok Post August 16, 2018; Bangkok Post, February 15, 2019). 
 
China’s rail diplomacy and local challenges 
 
As part of BRI, the Sino-Thai rail project was of particular interest for the Chinese 
government because Thailand was seen as an important player in the fast-growing Mekong 
area and because it was placed strategically in the middle of the central Pan-Asia Railway 
Network line. The country was also targeted because Thailand normally acted as 
“middlemen” in China’s dialogue with ASEAN and because Thailand is not a party in the on-
going South China Sea conflict.  
 
Against this background, the Thai junta had expected that China would care more about 
foreign policy than narrow commercial interests. Therefore, the expectation was that Beijing 
would forego profit in order to serve broader strategic objectives and would be somewhat 
liberal in the financial terms it sought for the project. However, during the negotiation 
process, the Chinese were much more business-oriented than the Thais had expected (The 
Nation, March 28, 2016; Crispin 2016). 
 
One particularly contentious negotiation issue was the total construction costs, where China 
reportedly provided prices well beyond the estimated 400billion baht. There was also 
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disagreement on financing costs, where the Thai side wanted a “friendly rate” of no higher 
than 2% on a Chinese loan from the Chinese Exim Bank, while Chinese negotiators argued 
for a 2.5% interest rate (The Nation, May 18, 2015, The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 
2016). A further contentious issue was burden sharing, where the financing and shareholding 
structures were changed back and forth during the meetings. Thailand had expected that the 
Chinese would take a substantial stake of about 60-70% but, as mentioned above, the first 
phase from Bangkok-Nakhon Ratchasima ended with full Thai ownership.  
 
Thai expectations concerning burden sharing and concessional interest rates were influenced 
by the financing conditions given by the Chinese side in negotiations on railway projects with 
Indonesia and Laos. In Indonesia, China was in strong competition with the Japanese over the 
$5 billion, 142 km Jakarta-Bandung HSR project. China entered a joint venture consortium 
and lending from the China Development Bank made up 75% of the line’s funding, which 
was given with a 10-year grace period and a 2% interest rate for a dollar-denominated loan 
(Salim and Negara 2016, 8). However, Thailand did not benefit from the same fierce rivalry. 
Moreover, as argued by Crispin (2016) – and consistent with the information on the Exim 
Bank presented above – China was increasingly becoming profit-oriented and thus unwilling 
to give concessionary interest rates. In Laos, the Chinese provided the capital and took a 70% 
share in the $6 billion, 427km Vientiane-Boten (Chinese border) standard gauge, single track, 
medium-speed line (Vientiane Times, December 3, 2015). However, Laos is a poorer country 
that could not fund the project on its own and the Chinese concessionaires also obtained 
privileges for so-called “spatial development” along the railway lines and the loan repayment 
was linked to mining revenues (The Nation, May 2, 2016). In contrast, Thailand has chosen 
to find alternative funding and avoid Chinese demands for collateral ( The Nation, August 14, 
2017; Interview, NESDB Official, Bangkok, February 2016). The Thai side did not want to 
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involve the Chinese constructors in land development. The relevant land was actually land 
that the king long time ago gave for free to SRT. That land was legally only open for leasing 
arrangements and not owner rights (The Nation February 6, 2016; The Nation February 26, 
2016; Interview public official February 2016).7 
 
The on-going negotiations on financing and burden sharing are heavily influenced by the 
expected economic viability of the MSR project. The financial return from the line is not 
obvious. In contrast to the Japanese HSR project, which runs between Thailand’s two main 
cities  the population density is much lower along the Sino-Thai line. Among academics and 
public officials with transportation expertise there are strong doubts regarding this line’s 
financial and economic viability (The Nation, March 16, 2016; The Nation, June 22, 2017). 
This doubt is consistent with the findings of research on HSR in China, where high ticket 
prices and limited demand in the less developed areas in western and central China double-
tracking projects in addition to a HSR project. The negotiations on Japanese involvement in 
railway upgrading started in February 2015 when Prime Minister Shinzō Abe invited Gen 
Prayuth to Japan. During meetings, a joint venture model was suggested and the two leaders 
signed a memorandum of intent concerning three railway routes – Bangkok-Chiang Mai HSR 
plus two East-West projects. While China is Thailand’s main trading partner, Japan has a 
much greater commercial interest in infrastructure development and especially in supporting 
infrastructure development that involves the greater Bangkok Area, the Eastern Seaboard and 
other Japanese economic strongholds in Thailand. The Japanese rail industry is well placed to 
get substantial orders. Moreover, the junta prioritised the Eastern Economic Corridor in an 
area with several Japanese investment clusters (Prasert 2015; BoI 2016, 5; Bangkok Post, 
January 4, 2017). Nevertheless, the Bangkok-Chiang Mai HSR project is still under 
negotiation with financing a major issue after a Japanese study estimated total costs of 400-
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500 billion baht. Following a feasibility study by Japan International Co-operation Agency 
showing that the passenger load would be only one-third of the original estimate, in October 
2018 Japan underlined that it was not interested in a joint-venture model (Bangkok Post, 
October 24, 2018). Meanwhile, the Thai side was conducting a feasibility study of a medium-
speed train service and invited Japan to become involved in the Bangkok-Rayong HSR 
project (The Nation, December 27, 2017; The Nation, February 10, 2018). 
 
Overall, Thai officials had difficulties negotiating with the Chinese, who have been seen as 
less generous and less willing to take on risk than the Thai side had expected. Conversely, the 
Chinese had difficulties with what they considered as ever-changing conditions and offers 
from Thai negotiators and political leaders (Interview, Ministry of Transport Official, 
Bangkok, February 2016). Still, after several delays, a deal was made on the first phase and 
the design work and engineering contract was signed. Even through the project has changed 
from the early “loan-and-build” HSR project to one based on an EPC model, the first step is 
not necessarily a bad deal for China. As Thailand is funding the project, China takes on 
minimal risk if the project is not financially viable. Further, the Chinese SOEs will avoid 
competition on delivery of railways, system technology and rolling stock, and China will still 
be invited to take a stake in subsequent phases. Conversely, by having Nakhon Ratchasima as 
the terminus, the Thai side still has some leverage over China, as the line makes little sense 
for China if the full route to Nong Khai is not constructed. 
 
Economic diplomacy versus economic statecraft 
 
China’s rail diplomacy in Thailand pre-dates the military regime, but negotiations did 
intensify during the second round of HSR diplomacy and the BRI campaign. Chinese 
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preferences and behaviour during the negotiations on the Sino-Thai rail project are consistent 
with the pattern revealed in the preceding sections of this article, that is, that for China the 
project is predominantly about economic diplomacy. There are several reasons for this 
assessment. 
 
First and foremost, China did not want to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of rail 
infrastructure provision, take big risks or forego financial returns to obtain the deal. Next, 
massive over-capacity in the Chinese rail and associated industries in combination with 
weighty concerns about profitability imply that overseas markets are needed to absorb this 
over-capacity and support the companies. Moreover, and related, China saw the Sino-Thai 
project as part of a broader economic co-operation that could support the process of 
upgrading and internationalising the Chinese economy. Thus, Premier Li at the 5th GMS 
summit in December 2014 where the Sino-Thai MoUs were signed – stated that: 
 
China will take active part in establishing manufacturing, technological and industrial 
parks in the five countries, especially along the railway that will soon be jointly 
constructed by China and Thailand, and will establish factories for production in local 
regions with its advanced capacity and help the neighbouring countries boost 
employment directly (Li 2014). 
 
Finally, even though the central line of the Pan-Asia Network railway ends at the Gulf of 
Thailand, it will, when finalised, improve market access for the South-western part of China 




Though China does not want to take big risks, this does not rule out an element of geo-
economic strategy involved in the Thai case. The rail project is part of China’s positioning 
itself as a regional provider of infrastructure and China has a strategic interest in presenting 
its economic power in a non-threating manner. Moreover, China can use infrastructure 
connectivity projects to make alliances and raise its profile as a responsible regional power. 
In doing that, it challenges the traditional and dominant infrastructure provider, Japan, 
although in the case of Thailand, Japan is competing on complementary rail routes. 
Furthermore, following Norris (2016) China is in better position to use statecraft in 
government-to-government negotiations, with state-linked institutions and corporations 
involved and not competing with each other. Finally, for a while, the 2014 Thai coup 
significantly improved relations between China and Thailand. Whereas Western countries, in 
particular the USA, condemned the military coup, downgraded its political ties and reduced 
military aid, China accepted the military junta without condemnation, declared it would not 
interfere in Thailand’s internal affairs and intensified collaboration with the junta.  
 
On the Thai side, the Sino-Thai rail project predated the military coup, but the Junta gave it 
high priority and decided finally to push it through by decree despite considerable criticism 
and bureaucratic foot-dragging. The Sino-Thai project is just one part of a huge infrastructure 
package that the military regime prioritised in order to mitigate low economic growth rates 
and stagnating investments. While low population density, among other reasons, puts the 
financial viability of the Sino-Thai project into jeopardy, the project may in the context of the 
other mega-infrastructure projects compensate for low levels of private investment. Still this 
requires that project be fast-tracked, but this would be unusual as slow and delayed 




Moreover, the Thai model of accumulation has for long been connected to waves of foreign 
investments. The shift from global production chains to China-driven regional production 
chains has led to Thai “charm offensives” to attract Chinese investors in a range of sectors. 
However, China is still more of a trading rather than an investment partner. While China is 
Thailand’s largest trading partner, followed by Japan, the latter continues to dwarf China as 
an investor. During  2015-2017 inward FDI from China amounted to just 18% of Japan’s FDI 
flows into Thailand (Ministry of Commerce, 2017; Bank of Thailand, 2018). Hence, even 
though the junta is to some extent driven by macro-economic rationality, the persistent 
priority given to the Sino-Thai rail project is probably motivated more by domestic politics 
than by foreign policy concerns.  
 
In relation to domestic politics, the Bangkok-Nong Khai-line will run through the Northeast, 
which is one of the poorest regions in Thailand and the region where Thaksin Shinawatra and 
“the red shirts” have an electoral stronghold. Hence, an obvious reason for pushing the 
project is for the junta to show that it “cares about the Northeast.” This could backfire, 
however, if environmental effects and land issues becomes contentious. Furthermore, military 
governments have problems with output legitimacy, so the junta has to show that something 
“is done” to solve economic stagnation and help farmers. The regime used public 
procurement negotiations and bartering on the project to guarantee prices for rice and rubber 
producers and to resolve stockpiling problems. However, as negotiations went on, the 
agricultural barter deal faded out.  
 
In terms of foreign policy, Thailand is the USA’s oldest ally in the region and a signatory to 
one of five formal US treaty alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. Thailand has generally 
followed a strategy of balancing the USA and China, showing a flexible and pragmatic 
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approach in specific circumstances (Pongphisoot 2016; Hewison 2018). During the Asian 
Economic Crisis of 1997-1998, China supported Thailand. This stood in contrast to the USA, 
which chastised Thailand and backed IMF austerity measures. Later governments prioritised 
collaboration with China. This accelerated in the aftermath of the military coup, when the 
Western countries downgraded relations (Storey 2015). The December 2014 rail deal was a 
headline part of this closer relationship between China and Thailand. In relation to the deal a 
junta spokesman stated that the “railways are a very important issue…. This is fundamental 
and will reinforce our cooperation with China” (cited in Parameswaran 2014). Concurrently, 
Thailand turned to China for military equipment (Tow 2016 43-44). Hence, the Sino-Thai 
negotiations on the rail project took place in context where China stood out as a favoured and 
reliable partner (Pongphisoot 2016; 2017a).  
 
Even if foreign policy objectives were not the main driver behind the Sino-Thai rail project, 
the project had foreign policy implications. The non-invitation of Prayuth to the Silk Road 
Summit in May 2017 and his follow-up on this is a clear illustration. Hence, with a more 
malleable Donald Trump in the White House, the junta sought to get Thai-USA relations 
back on track. Overall, it appears that Thailand has used its traditional “bamboo bending in 
the wind” approach to its superpower relations. In its rail upgrading negotiations, the Junta 
has sought to balance its regional partners – Japan and China (Pongphisoot 2017b; Hewison 
2018). 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The article has sought to answer the following questions: What are the driving forces behind 
the SREB initiative; what are the rationales behind Sino-Thai rail project; and, how can the 
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process and outcome of Sino-Thai negotiations be understood? The main issue motivating 
these questions is whether China’s economic diplomacy seeks commercial goals and, in a 
neo-mercantilist manner, broader national economic goals or whether BRI and related 
overseas projects are aspects of geo-strategy, where economic statecraft serves foreign policy 
objectives. The article has argued that BRI, HSR diplomacy and the Sino-Thai rail project are 
driven predominantly by economic and commercial rationales. Chinese rail diplomacy is a 
case of economic diplomacy and moreover seems to be a case of what Brautigam and Tang 
(2012) term “the developmental state abroad.” Even though the Chinese party-state, as 
suggested by Jones and Zou (2017), is characterised by conflictual fragmentation, this does 
not rule out that President Xi in cases with limited conflicts of interests can significantly 
moderate this trend through leading small group co-ordination and strong signaling, and 
thereby can ensure that strategic internationalisation policies are followed by central state 
actors and leading SOEs. 
 
The BRI initiative reflects China’s emerging economic power. It is a new round of the 
ongoing opening of the Chinese economy, in which China seeks to obtain more flexible 
arrangements to accommodate its expanding economic interests. Rather than prioritising a 
rebalancing towards a consumption-driven economy, the Xi administration is supporting 
technological upgrading, nurturing national champions to become internationally 
competitive, fostering Chinese standards, stimulating China-centred regional production 
networks, ensuring resource access and exporting domestic over-capacity in the form of 
capital-intensive goods and capacity expansion abroad. In addition, the huge infrastructure 
gap in Central and Southeast Asia opens business opportunities for Chinese construction 
companies and equipment manufacturers. Through BRI and regional and bilateral 
38 
 
infrastructure diplomacy initiatives, the Chinese leadership also promotes the 
internationalisation of state-owned railway constructors and train producers.  
 
The Sino-Thai railway project is part of the land-based BRI. China hopes to be able to build 
the central line of a Pan-Asia Rail Network from Kunming to Singapore. Thailand is 
geographically located in the middle of the line and hopes to become a regional hub by 
expanding railway projects. Despite China’s eagerness to promote first high-speed, then 
quasi-high-speed rail, the Sino-Thai project demonstrated the limits to China’s willingness to 
take on economic risks and forego financial return in order to serve wider economic and 
strategic goals. The project has been delayed several times and only a small 3.5 km of the 
first phase of the line is under construction (March 2019).  
 
BRI is a vision rather than a strategy and we should expect that overseas HSR projects will 
meet setbacks and need adjustment when new opportunities arise. As argued by Gonzales-
Vincente (2011), local contingencies play an important role in China’s overseas operations. 
This is the case for Thailand and elsewhere along the Pan-Asia Railway Network (Chan 
2016, 14-18; Pavlićević and Kratz 2018). Along the central Kunming-Singapore line, the 
Sino-Laos MSR project got the green light in November 2015 and the five-year construction 
phase commenced in December 2016. Despite complicated tunnel drilling, the project is 
moving forward despite protests by local peasants over the lack of proper compensation and 
activists having raised concerns regarding the national debt burden (The Nation, February 7, 
2018). For the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore HSR, the two countries issued a joint tender for 
project in December 20, 2017 but the incoming government led by Mahathir Mohamad 
wanted to cancel the project. However, in September 2018, the two countries agreed to a 
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face-saving two-year suspension up to May 31, 2020 (The Strait Times, December 20, 2017¸ 
The Strait Times, January 31, 2019). 
 
 The Western line of the Pan-Asia rail network construction is still ongoing in Southwest 
China along the Kunming-Dali-Ruili line with a completion data in 2022. The subsequent 
section through Myanmar drew local protests and the Thein Sein government in 2014 let the 
MoU with China expire. However, the stalled project was reactivated in the China-Myanmar 
Economic Corridor agreement that was signed by the Myanmar government in September 
2018 (Asia Times, February 21, 2019). The Eastern line faces difficulties in Vietnam because 
of anti-Chinese feelings that intensified due the South China Sea conflict. In addition, 
competition from Japan is seen in Vietnam. Still, Vietnam lent diplomatic support to BRI and 
in November 2017, the two countries signed an MoU on promotion of a re-activated “Two 
Corridors, One Belt” framework and the BRI (Rodgers 2016; Hiep 2018). Cambodia’s leader 
Hun Sen has endorsed BRI but a planned north-south railway project involving CRC has not 
been realised (Chheang 2017). In Indonesia, the Jakarta-Bandung HSR line, which had a 
ground-breaking ceremony in January 2016, ran into land procurement problems but the 
project started in 2018 and completion is expected in 2021 (Asia Times October 20, 2017; 
The Jakarta Post, February 26, 2019). In short, there are some progress but also many 
stumbling blocks for China’s rail diplomacy in Southeast Asia (see Pavlićević and Kratz 
2018). 
 
Even though the Chinese promotion of the Pan-Asia Rail Network is driven predominantly 
by economic logic, there are also domestic political and foreign policy dimensions. President 
Xi is committed to the BRI project and the Kunming-Singapore rail project, of which the 
Sino-Thai project is a part, is supposed to provide fertile ground for broader regional and 
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bilateral co-operation. Furthermore, China seeks to be a responsible regional power and to 
match Japan’s developmental profile with infrastructure provision in Southeast Asia. In brief, 
China hopes that its infrastructure diplomacy can propel the country’s rise as a friendly 
regional power.  
 
Similarly, the project is also from the perspective of Thailand’s military junta a signal to “a 
powerful friend.” When the junta seized power, negotiations on the Sino-Thai rail project 
intensified, but the timely construction of the line has been far from assured. For Prime 
Minster Prayuth, the project was part of a broader infrastructure bonanza to boost economic 
growth and the junta wanted to break ground as a show of power and to demonstrate that it 
can “get things done.” By decree a range of legal bottlenecks was cleared, but the bidding and 
procurement process will be difficult and the project may lead to civil society protests over a 








ACIF. 2016. December. ACIF 2016. ASEAN Community in Figures, Jakarta: The ASEAN 
Secretariat. 
ADB. 2009. Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia. Manila: Asian Development Bank and Asian 
Development Bank Institute. 
Arase, D. 2015. “China’s Two Silk Roads Initiative. What it Means for Southeast Asia.” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2015: 25-45. 
ASEAN. 2016. “Overview over ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations”, January 18. Accessed 
February 28, 2019, http://asean.org/?static_post=overview-asean-china-dialogue-
relations. 
Bank of Thailand. 2018. “Foreign Direct Investments Classified by Country 2016. EC-XT-
057.” Bank of Thailand website. Accessed February 20, 2018. 
http://www2.bot.or.th/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?reportID=654&language=eng. 
BoI. 2014. “Industry Focus: Singular Infrastructure.” Thailand Investment Review, 24 (9): 5-
7. 
BoI. 2016. “Thailand 4.0 and The Eastern Economic Corridor Project Drive Economic 
Development.” Thailand Investment Review, 26 (8): 5-6. 
Brautigam, D. and X. Tang. 2012. ‘Economic Statecraft in China’s New Overseas Special 
Economic Zones: Soft Power, Business and Resource Security?’ International Affairs 
88 (4): 799-816. 
Breslin, S. 2013. “China and the South. Objectives, Actors and Interactions.” Development 
and Change, 44 (6): 1273-1294. 
Brzezinski, Z. 1997. The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and its Geostrategic 
Imperatives, New York: Perseus Books. 
42 
 
Cai, P. 2017. “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Lowy Institute for 
International Policy, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/understanding-belt-
and-road-initiative.  
Callahan, W. 2016. “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional 
Order.” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 1 (3): 226-243. 
Chan, G. 2016. “China’s High-speed Rail Diplomacy. Global Impacts and East Asian 
Responses.” Korea: East Asia Institute Working Paper, February. 
Chen M., H. Tang and K. Zhang. 2014. “Some Critical Issues in the Development of Chinese 
High-Speed Rail: Challenges and Coping Strategies”, Journal of Transportation 
Technologies 4 (2): 164-174. 
Chheang,V. 2017. “Cambodia Embraces China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute, ISEAS Perspective, 
2017/48. 
Clarke, M. 2017. “The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Grand Strategy?” Asia Policy 
24: 71-79. 
Corkin, L. 2011. “Redefining Foreign Policy Impulses toward Africa: The Roles of the MFA, 
the MOFCOM and China Exim Bank.” Journal of Current China Affairs 40 (4): 61-
90. 
CRCC. 2017. China Railway Construction Corporation Ltd website. Accessed October 26, 
2017. http://english.crcc.cn/.  
CREC.  2017. Company Profile. China Railway Group website. Accessed October 26, 2017. 
http://www.crecgi.com/en/?about/tp/496.html. 
Crispin, S. 2016. “China-Thailand Railway Project gets Untracked.” The Diplomat, April 1. 




EIU. 2016. “Assessing Mega-mergers through the CSR-CNR Lens.” Country Report China 
October 2016, Economist Intelligence Unit. 
Ferdinand, P. 2016. “Westward Ho – The China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese 
Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping.” International Affairs 92 (4): 941-957. 
Gereffi, G. 2014. “Global Value Chains in a Post-Washington Consensus World.” Review of 
International Political Economy 21 (1): 9-37. 
Gonzales-Vicente, R. 2011. “The Internationalization of the Chinese State.” Political 
Geography 30: 402-411. 
Hewison K. 2018. “Thailand: An Old Relationship Renewed.” The Pacific Review 31 (1): 
116-130. 
Hiep, L. 2018. “The Belt and Road Initiative in Vietnam: Challenges and Prospects.” 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute, ISEAS 
Perspective, 2018/18. 
Hofman, B. 2015. “China’s One Belt One Road initiative: What we know thus far.” World 
Bank Blogs, April 4. Accessed March 12, 2019. 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/eastasiapacific/china-one-belt-one-road-initiative-what-
we-know-thus-far. 
Holslag, J. 2015. “Unequal Partnerships and Open Doors: Probing China’s Economic 
Ambitions in Asia.” Third World Quarterly 36 (11): 2112-2129. 
Holslag, J. 2016. “Geoeconomics in a Globalized World: The Case of China’s Export 
Policy.” Asia Europe Journal 14 (2): 173-184. 
Hong, Z, 2016. “China’s One Belt One Road: An Overview of the Debate.” Singapore: 




Hung, H. 2015. “China Fantasies”, Jacobin, 19. Accessed March 19, 2019, 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/12/china-new-global-order-imperialism-
communist-party-globalization.  
Hunt, L. 2017. “China-Thailand Rail Project: New Movement, Old Problems?” The 
Diplomat, August 29. Accessed March 1, 2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-thailand-rail-project-new-movement-old-
problems/. 
Janssen, P. 2016. “Double-tracking takes Priority.” Railway Gazette International, 
December: 52-53. 
Jones, L. and Y. Zou. 2017. “Rethinking the Role of State-owned Enterprises in China’s 
Rise.” New Political Economy 22 (6): 743-760. 
Kratz A. and P. Pavlićević. 2016. “China’s High-Speed Rail Diplomacy: Riding a Gravy 
Train?” London: King’s College, Lau China Institute Working Paper Series. Accessed 
March 2, 2019, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/lci/documents/working-
papers/Lau-China-Institute-Working-Papers-1.pdf. 
Kozul-Wright R. and D. Poon. 2017. “Learning from China’s Industrial Strategy.” East Asia 
Forum, May 11. Accessed March 3, 2019. 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/05/11/learning-from-chinas-industrial-strategy/. 
Lee, D. and B. Hocking. 2010. “Economic Diplomacy.” In The International Studies 
Encyclopedia, vol. II, Edited by R. Denemark, 1216-1227. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell. 
Leutert, W. 2016. “State-owned Enterprise Mergers: Will Less be More?” China Analysis, 
European Council of Foreign Relations, November: 2-5. 
Li, K. 2014. “Li Keqiang attends the Opening Ceremony of Fifth Summit of the Greater 
Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
45 
 
People's Republic of China website, December 20. Accessed October 15, 2016. 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1221882.shtml.  
Li, K. 2016. “Remarks by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China at the 19th China-ASEAN Summit to commemorate the 25th 
Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.” The State Council website. 
September 9. Accessed October 10, 2016. 
http://english.gov.cn/premier/speeches/2016/09/09/content_281475437552250.htm. 
Lieberthal, K. and M. Oksenberg. 1988. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and 
Processes, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lin, Y. 2015. “’One Belt and One Road’ and Free Trade Zones – China’s New Opening-up 
Initiatives.” Frontiers of Economics in China 10 (4): 585-590. 
Liu, W and M. Dunford. 2016. “Inclusive Globalization: Unpacking China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative.” Area Development and Policy 1 (3): 323-40. 
Liu, R., L. Liu and H. Shaodong. 2016. “High Speed Rail Development in China. A Case of 
State-guided Technology Transfer.” In China as an Innovation Nation, edited by Y. 
Zhou, W. Lazonick and Y. Sun, 165-191. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Lu, X. 2016. China “One belt & One Road” (OBOR) Initiative: Background, Contents and 
Perspective, Lausanne: IMD, February 12. Accessed March 14, 2019, 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-one-belt-road-obor-initiative-background-
contents-xiankun-lu. 
Luttwak, E. 1990.” From Geopolitics to Geo-economics. Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce.” The National Interest, 20: 17-23. 
Mackinder, H. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographic Journal 23 (4): 
298-321. 
Mearsheimer, J. 2006. “China’s Unpeaceful Rise.” Current History 105 (690): 160-162.  
46 
 
Ministry of Commerce. 2018. Thailand Trade Statistics. Export and Import by Country. 
Accessed February 28, 2018. http://tradereport.moc.go.th/TradeEng.aspx. 
Minjiang, L. 2015. “China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative: New Round Opening Up?. 
Singapore: S. Rajaratham School of International Studies RSIS Commentary No. 050, 
March 11. 
Naray, O. 2008. Commercial Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview. 7th World Conference of 
TPOs, The Hague, The Netherlands. Accessed January 4, 2019, 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Trade_Support_Institutio
ns/TPO_Network/Content/Conferences/2008/NarayConferencepaper.pdf. 
NDRC. 2015. “Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road.” National Development and Reform Commission, 
March 28. Accessed March 4, 2019, 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. 
NDRC . 2017. National Development and Reform Commission webpage. Accessed October 
10, 2017. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/leader/. 
NESDB. 2016. Transport Infrastructure Development Directions. Bangkok: National 
Economic Social Development Board Presentation Slides, February (unpublished). 
Norris, W. 2016. Chinese Economic Statecraft. Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy and State 
Control. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Obama, B. 2015. Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address. White House 
Release, January 20. Accessed March 30, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015. 
Parameswaran, P. 2014. “Thailand Turns to China.” The Diplomat, December 20. Accessed 
December 31, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2014/12/thailand-turns-to-china/.  
47 
 
Parameswaran, P. 2016. “China-Thailand Rail Project Back on Track with Cost Agreement.” 
The Diplomat, September 21. Accessed December 31, 2017, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-thailand-rail-project-back-on-track-with-cost-
agreement/.  
Pavlićević D. and A. Kratz 2017. “Implications of Sino-Japanese Rivalry in High-Speed 
Railways for Southeast Asia.” East Asian Policy, 9: 15-25. 
Pavlićević, D. and A. Kratz. 2018. “Testing the China Threat Paradigm: China’s High-speed 
Railway Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.” The Pacific Review, 31 (2):151-168. 
Peel, M and L. Hornby. 2016. “China Regional Venture Struggles to Gather Steam.” 
Financial Times, September 25. Accessed February 28, 2019, 
https://www.ft.com/content/76806da6-8190-11e6-8e50-8ec15fb462f4.  
Petsinger, M. 2017, “What is Geoeconomics?” The World Today 72 (6): 1.  
Pongphisoot Busbarat. 2016. “ ‘Bamboo Swirling in the Wind’: Thailand’s Foreign Policy 
Imbalance between China and the United States.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38 
(2): 233-57. 
Pongphisoot Busbarat. 2017a. “China’s ‘Shame Offensive’: The Omission of Thailand’s 
Prime Minister from the Belt and Road Summit 2017.” Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute ISEAS Perspective, 54. 
Pongphisoot Busbarat. 2017b. “Shopping Diplomacy: The Thai Prime Minister’s Visit to the 
United States and its Implications for Thai-US Relations.” Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute ISEAS Perspective, 78. 
Pichet Kunadhamraks. 2015. Thailand’s Transport Infrastructure Development Strategy 
2015-2022. Office of Transport Planning, Ministry of Transport, Slides presentation. 





Prasert Attanandana. 2015.The Infrastructure Development Program for State Railway of 
Thailand. State Railway of Thailand (SRT), Slides Presentation. October. Accessed 
March 18, 2018, 
http://eit.or.th/DownloadDocument/Infrastructure%20development%20program%20f
or%20SRT%20Oct%202015%20[Compatibility%20Mode].pdf . 
Rogers, D. 2016. “Vietnam to Probe High-speed Railway between Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi”, 
Global Construction Review, October 31. Accessed June 30, 2017, 
http://www.globalconstructionreview.com/news/vietnam-probe-high-sp7eed-
rail7way-betw7een-ho-chi/. 
Rolland, N. 2015. “China’s New Silk Road.” NBR Commentary. The National Bureau of 
Asian Research, February 12. Accessed June 28, 2015, 
http://nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=531. 
RTG. 2017. “Cabinet Meeting on Tuesday July 11, 2017.” Royal Thai Government website. 
Accessed March 19, 2019, https://www.thaigov.go.th/news/contents/details/5207. 
Salim, W. and S. Negara. 2016. “Why is the High-Speed Rail Project so Important to 
Indonesia.” Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak Institute, 
ISEAS Perspective, 2016/16, April 7. 
SCIO. 2016. “China Issues First Big Data Report on Belt and Road Initiative.” The State 
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China website, October 28. 
Accessed October 18, 2019, 
http://www.scio.gov.cn/32618/Document/1501156/1501156.htm.  
Setser, B. 2016. “The Return of the East Asian Saving Glut.” New York: Council of Foreign 
Relations CFR Discussion Paper, October. 
49 
 
Sparke, M. 2007. “Geopolitical Fears, Geoeconomic Hopes, and the Responsibilities of 
Geography.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97 (2): 338-349. 
State Council of the Peoples Republic of China. 2015. “Production Capacity Cooperation.” 
State Council. Accessed February 10, 2019, 
http://english.gov.cn/2015special/productioncapacitycooperation/.  
Storey, I. 2015. “Thailand’s Post-coup Relations with China and America: More Beijing, 
Less Washington.” Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Yusof Ishak 
Institute Trends in Southeast Asia, 2015/20. 
Summers, T. 2016. “China’s ‘New Silk Roads’: Sub-national Regions and Networks of 
Global Economy.” Third World Quarterly 37 (9): 1628-1643. 
Swaine, M. 2015. “Chinese Views and Commentary on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative.” 
China Leadership Monitor 47: 1-24. 
Tow, W. 2016. “U.S.-Southeast Asia Relations in the Age of the Rebalance.” Southeast Asian 
Affairs 2016: 35-53. 
Wang, Y. 2016. “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New 
Grand Strategy.” The Pacific Review 29 (3): 455-463. 
World Bank. 2014. World Bank Thailand Economic Monitor. Bangkok: World Bank Office, 
February 11. 
Wigell, M. 2016. “Conceptualizing Regional Power’s Geoeconomic Strategies: Neo-
imperialism, Neo-mercantilism, Hegemony, and Liberal Institutionalism.” Asia 
Europe Journal 14 (2): 135-151. 
Wilson, J. 2015. “Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing Between the 
TPP and RCEP?” Journal of Contemporary Asia 45 (2): 345-353. 
Yang, X and D. Parker. 2015. “Buckling Down: How Beijing is Implementing its ‘One Belt, 
One Road’, Policy Blog May 7, Center for Strategic and International Studies. 
50 
 
Accessed May 18, 2016, https://www.cogitasia.com/buckling-down-how-beijing-is-
implementing-its-one-belt-one-road-vision. 
Zhang, Z. 2016. “China’s International Strategy and Its Implications for Southeast Asia.” 
Southeast Asian Affairs 2016: 55-66. 
Zhu, S. and J. Pickles. 2014. “Bring In, Go Up, Go West, Go Out: Upgrading, 
Regionalisation and Delocalisation in China’s Apparel Production Networks.” 





                                                          
1 While there is no single standard, high-speed generally refers to railway speeds higher than 
200 kph. HSR is a system made up of: railway infrastructure, rolling stock, 
communication/control and operating processes. 
 
2 The project is MSR with trains running up to 180 kph but adopting Chinese railway 
standards and have standard-gauge double-track lines designed for a maximum speed of 250 
kph. The project is part of a regional HSR line linking China with parts of Southeast Asia. In 
this article, we refer to the Sino-Thai railway project after December 2014 as MSR. 
 
3 Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988, 137) argue that there is no “unified, hierarchical chain of 
command” in place and that decision-making in China could best be described as 
“fragmented authoritarianism.”  
 
4 Regional rebalancing through OBOR is difficult to implement, not least for West China. 
China’ first big data report on the OBOR has central Henan and southern Yunnan Provinces 
on the top-ten list, but the remaining eight are the already rich Eastern and South-eastern 
provinces: Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Tianjin, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong, and Beijing 
(Scio 2016). 
 
5 The national savings rate in 2015 was still high at almost 48% of GDP. Savings are through 





                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 On the process of technology transfer, reverse engineering and the successful development 
of local technological capabilities, see Liu, Liu and Shaodong (2016). 
 
7 The Chinese ambassador to Thailand in July 2016 felt the need to declare that China had 
never sought such development rights (China Daily, July 26, 2016). 
 
